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Abstract 
Over time, investors have become increasingly aware of the risks associated with a 
transition to a low-carbon economy. This study investigates the association between carbon 
emissions and the cost of debt financing for a sample of firms from the Eurozone in the period 
2010 – 2018. Results provide evidence that the risk premium required by lenders increases 
with carbon emissions. However, while the most polluting sectors were already charged 
before the Paris Agreement, and not further penalized in the subsequent period, our results 
indicate that the less polluting sectors started being charged a higher spread for their 
emissions only in the period after the Agreement. The Paris Agreement appears to be a 
turning point around which lenders have become aware of the strong commitment taken 
by policymaker in fighting climate change. Our findings also suggest that increased levels of 
disclosure on climate-related issues can mitigate corporate carbon risk. On the other hand, 
results are not compelling when we consider the effect of control mechanisms, such as 
external verification for emissions, board oversight of carbon risk and the presence of 
emission reduction targets, on the cost of debt. 
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In the last few years, financial investors have become increasingly aware of climate 
change as an emerging risk. According to the World Economic Forum (2020), 
environmental-related risks - including extreme weather events, failure of climate-change 
mitigation and adaptation, natural disaster and ecosystem collapse - are the top 5 risks in 
terms of likelihood and impact. The frequency and severity reached by extreme weather 
events show that there is substantial support for considering climate change as the gravest 
threat for economic activities (Pachauri et al., 2014). 
Several initiatives have been taken both at an international and national level to tackle 
global warming and to incentivize economic actors to undertake steps in order to accelerate 
the transition to a low-carbon economy. The 2015 Paris Agreement (also Agreement 
hereafter) represents a milestone in such a process. The Paris Agreement was signed in 
December 2015 and entered into force in November 2016 (UNFCCC, 2019) with the main 
objective of limiting the average temperature increase to 2 C° above the preindustrial level. 
Ratifying members, among which there is the European Union (EU hereafter), have 
committed themselves to submit a plan to reduce emissions and to make financial flows 
consistent with a low-carbon transition.  
The EU has always played a leadership role in climate policy (Rayner and Jordan, 2016). 
Energy and industrial policies are two competences of the EU. Accordingly, the European 
Commission has incorporated climate change mitigation into its actions, setting a variety 
of policies to boost investment in infrastructure, such as energy, transport, and 
communication, along with smart and green manufacturing (European Commission, 2018). 
Estimates of the needs for such investments in the EU are very significant. The overall 
infrastructure investment gap is estimated at roughly EUR 403 billion, while investment in 
research would require an annual investment of EUR 140 billion (European Investment 
Bank, 2018).  
Due to a high average public-sector debt, budgeting consolidation is set to continue at a 
national level. Thus, an upturn in investments cannot be based only on the public sector or 
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classic budgetary stimulus programs. The investment portfolios of financial institutions 
need to be mobilized and directed toward financing the transition toward a low-emissions 
economy (European Central Bank, 2018; European Commission, 2013).  
With this aim, in 2018 the European Commission published the “Action plan for 
financing a sustainable growth” (2018; also “Action Plan” hereafter), which is intended to 
reorient capital flows toward sustainable investments, to help investors manage financial 
risks stemming from climate change, and to promote transparency and long-termism in 
investment decisions. With this purpose, the Commission has started working on a 
taxonomy for sustainable economic activities based on their contribution to climate change 
mitigation and adaptation. Moreover, the Action Plan considers incorporating climate risk 
into prudential requirements. A green supporting factor, which gives banks capital relief for 
their green lending, is currently under discussion at the EU level. Finally, the “Guidelines 
on reporting climate-related information” (2019) issued by the European Commission 
provide a list of key-performance indicators, such as greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, 
useful to assess a company’s exposure to climate change risks.  
Central banks and supervision authorities, too, have started analyzing the impacts of 
climate change on banks’ portfolio and the stability of the financial system (NGFS, 2019). 
Climate change affects the financial system through three main channels. The first involves 
physical risks, such as floods, landslides, hurricanes, and wildfires, which can destroy 
relevant fixed assets, thus imposing losses on firms that impair their ability to operate and 
to repay their debt (NGFS, 2019). Faiella and Natoli (2019), for instance, indicate that over 
the last years Italian banks have reduced their credit supply to firms in risky areas. The 
second channel involves transition risk, which refers to the additional costs or devaluation 
of assets due to changes in the regulation made with the purpose of reducing GHG emissions 
and adjusting to low-carbon economy (Batten et al., 2018). The introduction of a carbon tax 
is a typical example of transition risk. Another is the phasing out of coal, already announced 
by eight EU countries, which is expected to significantly affect coal-based utilities (Euractiv, 
2019). The third channel involves liability risk, which is more specific to insurance 
companies and arises from firms that are damaged from climate change and consequently 
try to recoup their losses suing other parties or through their insurances. The Netherlands 
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Central Bank (Vermeulen et al., 2019), by combining different climate policy responses and 
energy technologies into four economic scenarios, finds that Dutch insurance might 
experience losses of around 11% of their total assets.  
This being the context, understanding whether and how higher carbon emissions result 
in a higher cost of capital is a key issue for all the market players - both capital providers 
and borrowers - as well as policymakers. To our knowledge, this study is the first to 
investigate the relationship between the cost of debt financing and corporate carbon risk 
for a sample of non-financial listed companies from the Eurozone for the period 2010-2018. 
We define carbon risk as any corporate risk related to carbon emissions likely to restrict 
managers’ ability to conduct business (Hoffmann & Busch, 2008). The focus is on non-
financial firms, as they represent the backbone of the EU economy, and on loans, which are 
the main corporate financing source in the EU (European Central Bank, 2018). Importantly, 
data availability allows us to investigate whether the Paris Agreement has changed the way 
lenders incorporate carbon risk in their investment decisions.  
Complementing prior analyses, our study documents that a positive relationship 
between carbon risk and the cost of debt holds in the context of the Eurozone. Interestingly, 
findings indicate that lenders started charging low emitters a higher risk premium for their 
carbon risk only after the Paris Agreement, when fighting climate change became a stronger 
commitment at the EU level. Higher emitters, instead, were already charged before the 
Agreement, and not further penalized in the subsequent period. Taken as a whole, our 
results suggest that the Paris Agreement represents a turning point after which capital 
providers started incorporating carbon risk into their lending decisions, both for low and 
high emitters. As such, they provide support to the European Commission’s initiatives 
aimed at driving the financial system to incorporate climate-related issues into asset 
allocation. They also show that lenders assess carbon risk on the basis of sector analyses 
rather than broader industry classifications.   
Furthermore, our study indicates that increased levels of climate-related disclosure can 
mitigate carbon risk. Results, on the other hand, are not compelling when we consider 
specific control mechanisms of carbon risk such as external validation of carbon emissions, 
board oversight of carbon risk and the existence of emissions reduction targets.  
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The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature and 
develops the research hypotheses. Section 3 explains the dataset construction and the 
econometric models, while Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes. 
2 Literature review and hypotheses development 
In the wake of the Paris Agreement and the European Commission’s Action Plan, there 
has been a growing interest in the relationship between corporate carbon risk and 
investors’ decisions. As mentioned above, the adoption of carbon pricing policies 
represents one important factor that could affect corporate risk, affecting borrowers’ future 
cash flows and, therefore, their ability to repay debts and maintain regular dividend 
payments. Some studies have also highlighted possible reputational risks for capital 
providers financing high carbon-risk borrowers, which could lower their capacity to attract 
future customers and their subsequent ability to generate revenues (e.g., Coulson & Monsk, 
1999; Subramamnian et al., 2015; Thompson, 1998; Thompson and Cowton, 2004).  
In general, research documents that capital providers take corporate carbon risk into 
consideration when they analyze a company’s risk profile and define their investment 
strategies (e.g., Matsumura et al., 2014; Weber, 2012). Carbon risk is usually 
operationalized as carbon intensity, which is computed as carbon emissions over revenues 
or total assets (Hoffmann & Busch, 2008). Some studies have investigated the relationship 
between carbon intensity and the cost of equity capital. Kim et al. (2015) as well as Trinks et 
al. (2017), among others, document that the cost of equity increases in carbon risk. 
Interestingly, results from Trinks et al. (2017) reveal that the relationship between the cost 
of equity and carbon emissions holds only when both scope 1 and 2 are considered, 
suggesting that capital providers take both direct and indirect emissions into consideration. 
Other studies have examined the effect of carbon emissions on the cost of debt. Results 
generally indicate that higher carbon emitters are considered riskier and thereby pay a 
higher cost of debt (e.g., Chen & Gao, 2012; Goss & Roberts, 2011; Jung et al., 2018; 
Kleimeier & Viehs 2018; Weber, 2012). Furthermore, Gianfrate and Peri (2019) document 
that green bonds are more financially convenient than non-green ones, supporting the view 
that green projects are considered less risky than the others.  
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As a first step for our analysis, we test whether a positive relationship between historical 
data on carbon emissions and the cost of capital also holds in the Eurozone context. We 
expect higher polluters to be charged an additional carbon risk premium for the higher 
uncertainty associated with the transition to a low-carbon economy, which may affect their 
future cash flows. Accordingly, our first hypothesis (in alternative form) states as follows: 
H1: Firms that exhibit a higher carbon risk pay a higher cost of debt. 
A consistent regulatory framework may play a key role in driving lending policies. With 
this purpose, the EU has set over time a variety of policies aimed at reorienting the economy 
towards low-emissions targets (European Commission, 2018; 2019). Research indeed 
suggests that after the Paris Agreement banks have started taking into account the risk 
associated to stranded assets. De Greiff, Delis, and Ongena (2018), for instance, find that 
since 2015 banks have charged a higher loan spread to fossil fuel firms with higher fossil 
fuel reserves. Capasso and Gianfrate (2019) show that in the aftermath of the Paris 
Agreement the exposure to climate change decreases the distance to default for an 
international sample of companies. Monasterolo and De Angelis (2020) report that the level 
of systemic risk for low-carbon stock indexes from the US, EU and global financial markets has 
significantly declined since the Paris Agreement. Coherently, our hypothesis is that after the 
Paris Agreement investors have increased their awareness of climate change issues, 
becoming more sensitive to carbon risk. Our hypothesis (in alternative form) states as 
follows: 
H2: The effect of carbon risk on the cost of debt is higher in the years following the 
Paris Agreement. 
Improving corporate disclosure on climate-related risks is one key point of the European 
Commission’s Action Plan (2018). In 2019, the European Commission issued the “non-
binding guidelines on reporting climate-related information”, which include guidance on 
reporting of climate-related information related to business models, key performance 
indicators, risks and their management. By providing this kind of information, companies 
can better incorporate carbon risk in their operations, while investors can better assess a 
company’s overall risk (Financial Stability Board, 2016). Understanding whether a 
relationship exists between increased levels of corporate disclosure on climate-related risks 
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and the cost of capital is therefore key for well-informed policymaking.  
According to the European Commission (2019), increased levels of disclosure of climate-related 
risks can provide important benefits to firms, including a potentially lower cost of capital. In the 
presence of increased levels of disclosure, a lower cost of capital could be ascribed to a 
reduction, for capital providers, of the uncertainty associated with the investment and thereby to a 
decrease in the risk premium component associated with information asymmetry. 
Lemma et al. (2017) indeed document that voluntary carbon disclosure is associated with 
a lower overall cost of capital for a sample of South African firms over the period 2010 – 
2015.  Kleimeier and Viehs (2018) find similar evidence for an international sample, while 
Jung et al. (2018) document this relationship for a sample of Australian firms. Gianfrate et 
al. (2015) however show that the effect of environmental information on the cost of debt varies according 
to geographical area. In contrast, a few studies point out that increased levels of carbon 
information come with proprietary costs and could result in revealing information with 
possible negative repercussions on firms (Guidry & Patten, 2012; Peters & Romi, 2014; 
Verrecchia, 1983).  
This being the context, we consider it important to provide further insight into this issue, thus 
verifying whether a negative relationship between increased levels of disclosure on carbon risks and the 
cost of debt holds within the specific context of the Eurozone. Consistent with prior research (Jung 
et al., 2018; Kleimeier & Viehs, 2018), we measure increased levels of transparency on 
climate-related issues as the willingness of a firm to respond to the Carbon Disclosure 
Project’s (CDP) questionnaire. CDP is a UK-based not-for-profit organization that targets 
listed companies with an annual survey concerning their carbon emissions and actions to 
mitigate climate change risk. The CDP survey is acknowledged worldwide as a leading 
source of a firm’s activity regarding climate change mitigation (Luo et al., 2012; Tang & 
Luo, 2014). For this reason, it represents one important data source for the European 
Commission (2017). Table 1 reports, per each year, the number of firms targeted and 
responding to the CDP survey - displayed by geographical area – along with the number of 
firms having verified emissions, board oversight of climate-related issues and emission 
reduction targets. Our CDP database covers the period 2010-2018 (CDP, 2019).  
We assume that increased levels of climate-related disclosure reduce information 
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asymmetry and thereby the risk premium component associated with it. Our third 
hypothesis therefore states (in alternative form) that: 
H3: Firms that increase the level of transparency on their carbon risk pay a lower cost of 
debt. 
Emissions data may be prone to measurement errors (Kaspereit & Lopatta, 2018; Busch 
et al., 2018). Asking a third party to verify the firm’s carbon emission according to an 
accepted and recognized emissions accounting standard should solve this problem, thus 
increasing data reliability. For the same reason, the European Commission’s guidelines on 
climate-related information (2019) recommend companies disclosing whether their carbon 
emissions are externally verified.  
Prior research suggests an important role for external certification in accessing both bank 
and equity financing (Kleimeier & Viehs, 2018; Trinks et al., 2017). Table 1 shows that the 
companies responding to the CDP survey have adopted virtuous behaviors over time in this 
respect. External verification of scope 1 emissions increased from 26% in 2010 to 56% in 
2018, whereas external verification of scope 2 emissions increased from 22% in 2010 to 55% 
in 2018. In Europe, this trend has been particularly relevant for emission-intensive 
industries (Green & Zhou, 2013).  
Our third hypothesis aims at verifying whether the existence of a third-party validation for 
at least scope 1 or scope 2 emissions exerts a mitigating effect on the cost of debt financing 
in the specific context of the Eurozone. Our hypothesis (in alternative form) therefore states 
as follows: 
H4: Firms whose carbon emissions are not verified by a third party pay a higher cost 
of debt. 
According to the European Commission (2018), corporate governance can significantly 
contribute to a more sustainable economy, allowing companies to take the strategic steps 
necessary to manage carbon risk by developing new technologies, adjusting business 
models toward circular economy and improving environmental performance. Moreover, 
the presence of adequate board oversight into climate change issues would give evidence of 
the firm’s commitment to address environmental issues, thus improving corporate 
reputation and legitimacy among stakeholders. The European Commission’s non-binding 
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guidelines (2019) therefore suggest that companies should disclose whether there is board 
insight of climate-related issues.  
Table 1 shows that, over time, companies responding to the CDP questionnaire increased 
board insight of climate change issues from 51% in 2010 to 71% in 2018. Evidence on the role 
of corporate board on carbon risk, however, is quite mixed. Some studies suggest a positive 
association between board environmental orientation and carbon performance (e.g., 
Moussa, 2018). In contrast, other studies show that boards generally do not fulfill their 
monitoring roles (e.g., Prado & Garcia, 2010). Environmental governance mechanisms 
focus more on avoiding reputational and/or regulatory harm than taking responsible 
actions (Bansal & Kistruck 2006; Cho et al. 2012; Neu et al. 1998; Patten 2005; Rodrigue 
et al., 2013).  
Consistent with the European Commission (2018, 2019), we assume that board 
monitoring can mitigate the corporate carbon risk, thus lowering the cost of debt. 
Coherently, our hypothesis (in alternative form) states as follows:  
H5: Firms that have board oversight of carbon risk pay a lower cost of debt. 
So far, our analysis has focused on the relationship between the cost of debt and historical 
data on carbon emissions. Nonetheless, carbon risk may impact firms to varying degrees 
depending on the actions that firms are undertaking to confront or even pre-empt the risks 
and challenges caused by carbon emissions (Labatt & White, 2007). For this reason, the 
non-binding guidelines of the European Commission recommend firms disclosing whether 
they have processes associated with activities that meet the criteria for substantially 
contributing to mitigation of or adaptation to climate change. Firms with emission reduction 
targets increased from 38% in 2010 to 64% in 2018.  
This being the context, we test whether the capital providers consider forward-looking 
information on carbon emissions as well.  In doing this, we assume that Eurozone firms 
having carbon emission reduction targets in place pay a lower cost of debt. Our last 
hypothesis therefore states (in alternative form) as follows:  
H6: Firms that have carbon emission reduction targets pay a lower cost of debt. 
 




3 Research design 
3.1. Data and sample construction 
To examine the relationship between the cost of debt financing and corporate carbon 
risk, we merge data from the CDP and Thomson Reuter’s ASSET4 databases. We start from 
the CDP dataset, which contains the information about external validation of carbon 
emissions, board insight of climate change issues and carbon emission reduction targets 
that we need for our analysis.  
Table 2 displays the sample selection process. We first select the companies from the 
Eurozone targeted by the CDP questionnaire. We focus on the Eurozone to avoid problems 
related to different currencies and monetary policies. We exclude firms from the financial 
sector, which are subject to specific regulatory requirements. Moreover, their liabilities are 
different in nature and thereby difficult to compare with other industries (Jung et al., 2018; 
Pittman & Fortin, 2004; Rajan & Zingales, 1995). We collect financial data from the 
Thompson Reuters database. We use this data provider for carbon emissions as well. In this 
way, we avoid self-selection bias. In fact, Thompson Reuters’ ASSET4 collects emission data 
from a variety of sources, including companies’ reports. As a result, it reports emissions 
also for firms that are targeted, but not responding to the CDP questionnaire. The CDP 
database, instead, contains only emission data released by the respondent firms, which may 
be more virtuous in tackling climate change than the others. Furthermore, our choice allows 
investigating whether increased levels of disclosure on climate-related issues, 
operationalized as the willingness to respond to the CDP survey, can mitigate carbon risk. 
Finally, ASSET4 corrects emissions data in case of ex-post adjustments by reporting 
companies (Busch et al., 2018), which enhances analysis reliability. Correlation between 
CDP and ASSET4 is nonetheless very high, i.e. 95% for scope 1 and 90% for scope 2 emissions 
(Busch et al., 2018). We exclude from our sample firms delisted, failed, or with zero debt. 
We finally drop observations for which the cost of debt is below the 5% or above the 95% 
percentile. Our final sample consists of 1,469 firm-year observations.  
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Table 3 shows our sample distribution over time, divided into firms targeted by the CDP 
survey, firms responding to the questionnaire, and firms having verified emissions, board 
oversights, and emission reduction targets. As one can notice, the number of firms targeted 
by the CDP survey increased by 86% from 118 in 2010 to 220 in 2018. The response rate 
varies from 69% in 2015 to 84% in 2011. The response rate is 83% in 2016 and 80%, both 
in 2017 and 2018. If compared to the lowest level of 69% in 2015, this data may suggest that 
after the Paris Agreement firms consider improving climate-related disclosure as beneficial. 
The lowest percentage of firms with an external validation for carbon emissions is 74% for 
scope 1 and 59% for scope 2, both in 2010, while the highest percentage is 94% for scope 1 
and 92% for scope 2, both in 2015. The highest percentage of firms with board oversight 
(91%) and emission reduction targets (93%) is in 2015, whereas the lowest percentage is in 
2018 (74% for board insight and 71% for emission reduction targets). While the number of 
firms answering the questionnaire increased in the period following the Paris Agreement, 
the percentage of firms with external validation for emissions, board oversight and 
emission reduction targets has decreased compared to 2015. The reason for this could be 
that firms answering the questionnaire for the first time were not sufficiently skilled in 
tackling climate change issues compared to those already involved in the program for many 
years. If this was the case, it would suggest that disclosing climate-related information may 
provide a good incentive for firms to adopt more virtuous behavior in this respect. 
 
(INSERT TABLE 2 and 3 ABOUT HERE) 
 
Table 4 displays the sample distribution according to industry classification. 
 
(INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE) 
 
As Table 4 shows, the industrials group is the most represented, accounting for 29% of 
observations.  The industrial group includes very different sectors: aerospace and defense, 
construction and materials, electronic and electrical equipment, general industrials, 
industrial engineering, industrial support services, and industrial transportation. Since very 
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different business models may correspond to very different carbon intensity, we will also 
account for such heterogeneity in our analysis. Consumer discretionary, which includes 15% 
of observations, also comprehends very different sectors such as car producers, media, and 
leisure goods. The other two relevant groups, which account for 10% of observations each, 
are basic materials, including chemicals and industrial materials, metals and mining, and 
utilities. 
Table 5 shows the geographical distribution of our sample. The most represented 
countries are France and Germany, which together account for 44% of the observations. 
Finland, Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands are the other most represented countries, 
accounting for 46% of the observations. 
 
(INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE) 
 
3.2. Empirical model and variable definitions 
We use ordinary least square regression to estimate the effect of the carbon risk on the 
cost of debt.  
3.2.1 Dependent variable: the cost of debt 
The dependent variable in our analysis is the logarithm of the cost of debt. We compute the 
cost of debt as the ratio between interest expense on the average debt (expressed in basis 
point). We use the logarithm to linearize the relationship between risk and return (Belsley 
et al., 1980). Specifically, the cost of debt for firm i in year t is computed as follows: 
codi,t = [(interest expensei,t)/((tot debti,t−1 + tot debti,t)/2)] (7) 
Interest expense includes interest expense on short- and long-term debt, while total debt 
is the sum of short- and long-term interest-bearing financial obligations. We truncate the 
dependent variable at the 5% and 95% percentiles of the distribution (Pittman and Fortin, 
2004). 
3.2.2 Independent variables  
3.2.2.1 Carbon risk  
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We use carbon intensity as an indicator of corporate carbon risk (e.g., Hoffmann & Busch, 
2008; Jung, 2018; Lewandowski, 2017). We compute carbon intensity as the ratio between 
scope 1 and scope 2 emissions and net sales (Jung et al., 2018; Lewandowski, 2017; Capasso 
& Gianfrate, 2019). Scope 1 includes direct emissions that originate from plants or sources 
owned or directly controlled by a company, whereas scope 2 includes emissions originating 
from the purchase of the electricity needed for a firm’s production activities (GHG Protocol, 
2019). Considering both scope 1 and scope 2 emissions provides a more comprehensive 
view of companies’ effectiveness in reducing carbon risk. Companies’ ability to decrease 
carbon intensity in the short term, for instance, relies more on scope 2 rather than scope 1 
emissions. In fact, buying energy from a sustainable energy producer is easier than 
investing in emissions reduction technologies, which are likely to be more expensive and 
require more time to be fully implemented (Busch & Lewandowski, 2018). We do not 
instead consider scope 3 emissions, which include all the indirect emissions that originate 
from a firm’s value chain (GHG Protocol, 2019). Scope 3 emissions are difficult to quantify 
and subject to material errors (Matisoff et al., 2012; Busch et al., 2018). As a result, both the 
quantity and quality of scope 3 emissions reporting remain highly uncertain (Matisoff et al., 
2012; Busch et al., 2018).  
We scale carbon emissions by revenues in order to account for different firm size and 
industry (Hoffmann & Busch, 2008). Unlike prior research (Jung et al., 2018; Kleimeier & 
Viehs, 2018), we test the cost of debt against one year-lagged carbon intensity in order to 
avoid endogeneity and to increase the robustness of our results with regard to the direction 
of the relationship between the cost of capital and carbon emissions. By using lagged 
carbon intensity, we also account for carbon emission data being available with a certain 
delay. Similarly, firms reap financial benefits from carbon emission mitigation over time 
(Brzobohaty & Jansky, 2010; Trump & Guenther, 2015). We also perform our analysis for 
a two year-lagged carbon intensity but correlation with the cost of debt is weaker.  
3.2.2.2 Control variables 
There is no doubt that a close relationship exists between investors’ expected returns and 
financial performance of the firms in which they are investing (e.g., Altman, 2017; 
Modigliani & Pogue, 1974) We therefore include companies’ financial ratios as control 
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variables in our regressions. After a wide review of the literature (e.g., Almamy et al., 2016; 
Altman et al., 2017; Tian & Yu, 2017), we select the following financial ratios: operating 
profit, leverage, working capital ratio and size. Operating profit, computed as the ratio of 
operating income over net sales, accounts for a firms’ profitability. We expect a negative 
relationship between this variable with the cost of debt as the more profitable firms are, the 
lower the probability to go bankrupt (e.g., Tudela & Young, 2004). Leverage is computed 
as total debt over total assets and controls for the level of indebtedness (Altman et al., 2017). 
The working capital ratio, computed as working capital over total asset, accounts for 
liquidity (Altman et al., 2017). We expect firms that are more indebted, or less liquid, to pay 
a higher spread on the cost of debt. Finally, we include the logarithm of total assets to proxy 
for firms’ size (Jung et al., 2018; Kleimeier & Viehs, 2018). Since larger companies are less 
likely to go bankrupt (i.e., Bernanke et al., 1996, 1999), we expect a negative correlation of 
this variable with company size (e.g., Jung et al., 2014). To control for monetary policy, we 
include the yearly average of the 6 months Euribor. Indeed, the cost of debt adjusts in line 
with the Euribor interest rate variation (Arce at al., 2013; Goss & Roberts, 2011; Moccero et 
al., 2014). As for carbon intensity, control variables are lagged by one year in order to avoid 
endogeneity (Du et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2017). Moreover, lending decisions likely incorporate 
a company’s  financial performance with a certain delay. We finally control for differences in 
industry and country. Industry classification is based on the Industry Classification 
Benchmark (ICB) taxonomy. In each regression, standard errors are clustered by firm and 
year (Petersen, 2009).  
3.3 The econometric models 
The econometric model used to test our first hypothesis is the following: 
 
ln(𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑖,𝑡) =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛼𝑘
𝑘
𝑖=1 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛼3𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 +  𝛼4𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝛼5𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡     (1) 
 
where ln(𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑖,𝑡) is the natural logarithm of the cost of debt for firm i in year t; carbon_int 
is the carbon intensity for firm i in year t-1; financial_controls is a vector of financial ratios 
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for firm i in year t-1; industry is the industrial sector for firm i; country is the country for 
firm i; and euribor is the euribor in year t-1. 
The presence of a post-Paris effect is tested with the following model: 
 
ln(𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑖,𝑡) =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛼2𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 × 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2015 + 𝛼3𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2015 +
∑ 𝛼𝑘
𝑘
𝑖=1 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼4𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 +  𝛼5𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝛼6𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡      (2) 
 
where post_2015 is a dummy equal to one after 2015, and zero otherwise, while carbon_int 
x post_2015 is an interaction term between the dummy variable and the carbon intensity. 
The other variables are defined as in model (1). 
 
To test the effect of increased level of disclosure on climate-related issues through 
answering the CDP questionnaire, we use the following model:   
 
ln(𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑖,𝑡) =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛼2𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 × 𝐶𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝐶𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 +
∑ 𝛼𝑘
𝑘
𝑖=1 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼4𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 +  𝛼5𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝛼6𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡   (3) 
 
where CDP is a dummy is equal to one if the firm answers the CDP questionnaire, and zero 
otherwise. Carb_int x CDP is the interaction term between the dummy and the carbon 
intensity. The other variables are defined as in model (1). 
 
The following regression is run in order to test for external verification of emissions: 
 
ln(𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛼2𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 × 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 +
∑ 𝛼𝑘
𝑘
𝑖=1 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼4𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 +  𝛼5𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝛼6𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡       (4) 
 
where verified is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has an external verification of 
emission either for scope 1 emissions or for scope 2 emissions, and zero otherwise. Carb_int 
x verified is the interaction term between the dummy and the carbon intensity. The other 
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variables are defined as in model (1). 
 
To investigate the role of the effect of board oversight on the cost of debt, the model is: 
 
ln(𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑖,𝑡) =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛼2𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 × 𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 +
∑ 𝛼𝑘
𝑘
𝑖=1 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼4𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 +  𝛼5𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝛼6𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (5) 
 
where board is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has board oversight of climate-
related issues, and zero otherwise. Carb_int x board is the interaction term between the 
dummy and the carbon intensity. The other variables are defined as in model (1). 
 
We finally run the following regression to investigate the role of carbon emission reduction 
targets in reducing the cost of debt: 
 
ln(𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑖,𝑡) =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛼2𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 × 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 +
∑ 𝛼𝑘
𝑘
𝑖=1 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼4𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 +  𝛼5𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝛼6𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡    (6) 
 
where target is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has emission reduction targets, 
and zero otherwise. Carb_int x target is the interaction term between the dummy and the 
carbon intensity. The other variables are defined as in model (1). 
4 Results1 
4.1 Descriptive statistics and correlation 
Table 6 displays descriptive statistics for the variables included in our regressions. The 
average value of carbon intensity is 0.41 tonnes of carbon dioxide per EUR 1,000 of 
 
1 This Section describes and comments on statistical results in compliance with the American Statistical 
Association Statement on Statistical Significance and P-values (Wasserstein and Lazard, 2016; Wasserstein 
et al., 2019). Accordingly, we report p-value for regression coefficients, while abandoning the dichotomization 
of results into “significant” and “not significant”. This approach treats statistical results as being much more 
incomplete than the norm, thus acknowledging that uncertainty exists everywhere in research and that this 
is exploratory in nature. 
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revenues, with a maximum value of 8.76. Data are consistent with other statistics (e.g., Jung 
et al. 2018). Firm leverage is, on average, 63% of the total assets, which is also in line with 
other analyses for EU companies (e.g., ECB 2018). Operating margin is, on average, 10%. 
93% of our sample verify either direct or indirect emissions, while 89% have board-
oversight of climate-related issues, and 90% set a carbon emission reduction target.  
 
(INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE) 
 
Table 7 displays the correlation matrix for the regression variables. As expected, carbon_int 
is positively correlated with the cost of debt, with a p-value < 0.001. Lev and the op_margin 
are also correlated with the cost of debt with the predicted positive and negative sign, 
respectively, and p-values < 0.001. The correlation coefficient on the wc_ta is negative but 
with a p-value = 0.341. Contrary to our expectations, the coefficient on size is positive with a 
p-value < 0.001. As expected, the existence of an external verification of emissions is 
negatively correlated with the cost of debt, with a p-value < 0.001.  Both the dummies 
board and target are negatively correlated with the cost of debt, although with larger p-
values = 0.373 and = 0.501 respectively. 
Collinearity diagnostics (not reported) show that the variance inflation factors for the 
explanatory variables are far below critical levels (e.g., Belsley et al. 1980; Greene 2008; 
Marquardt, 1970).  
 
(INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE) 
 
4.2 Multivariate analysis 
 4.2.1 The effect of carbon risk on the cost of debt  
Table 8 displays results from the regression model (1). Column (1) reports results from 
the regression with the control variables only, whereas column (2) includes carbon 
intensity. Column (1) and (2) refers to the full sample. 
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(INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE) 
 
Column (1) shows that, consistent with our prediction, the coefficient on Lev is positive with a p-
value = 0.004, indicating that the more firms are indebted, the higher the spread on debt. 
The coefficient on op_marg is negative with a p-value < 0.001. Contrary to our 
expectations, the coefficient on wc_ta is positive with a p-value = 0.040, which suggests that 
firms with higher values for this ratio are considered riskier. Indeed, a higher level of 
working capital on total assets could signal inefficient management of inventories or 
difficulties in collecting credits. The coefficient on Size is positive but with a high p-value = 
0.201. The constant is positive with a p-value < 0.001 (Jung et al., 2018; Capasso & Gianfrate, 
2019).  
The adjusted R2 in column (1) is equal to 25.7 %, indicating that a substantial variation 
in the cost of debt financing is left unexplained by the variables included in the regression. 
The low adjusted R 2 is in line with empirical literature showing that accounting data have 
lost value-relevance overtime (Lev & Gu, 2016) and provides consistent support to the 
European Commission’s claim (2018) that more non-financial disclosure is needed to 
better understand corporate risk both in absolute and relative terms. Residual analysis (not 
reported) suggests that results are not affected by omitted variable bias. Regression in 
column (2) includes carbon intensity. When we introduce the latter, the adjusted R2 
increases to 26.7% indicating that carbon intensity adds to explaining variation in the cost 
of debt financing. As expected, the coefficient on carbon_int is positive and statistically 
robust, with a p-value = 0.001.  
We then split the observations and run the regression for the pre- and post-Paris 
Agreement period, separately. In the post-Paris Agreement period, we include observations 
from 2016 to 2018. Column (3) shows the results from the regression for the pre-Paris 
Agreement period, while column (4) reports the results for the post-Paris Agreement 
period. The coefficients on carbon_int are positive in both the regressions, with a p-value 
= 0.093 for the Pre-Paris Agreement and a p-value < 0.001 for the post-Paris Agreement. 
A higher magnitude of the coefficient on carbon_int in column (4) suggests increasing 
lenders’ awareness to carbon risk in the aftermath of the Paris Agreement.  
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Our results are robust to different model specifications. We also perform a regression by 
excluding the top polluting sectors (i.e., electricity, and gas, water and multi-utilities) in 
order to check whether the “carbon intensity effect” on the cost of debt financing is led by 
the highest emitters. Results (not tabulated) are qualitatively similar to Table 8.            
4.2.2 The Post-Paris Agreement effect: a sectorial analysis 
Table 9 reports results from regression model (2).  
 
(INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE) 
 
Column (1) displays the results for the full sample. In this column, the coefficient on 
carbon_int x post_2015 is positive with a p-value = 0.059, which suggests an increased 
lenders’ sensitivity to corporate carbon risk in the aftermath of the Paris Agreement. The 
coefficient on post_2015, instead, is negative, with a p-value = 0.002, indicating that, on 
average, the risk premium has decreased since 2015. Such a finding is consistent with well-
established literature showing that the negative facility rate set by the European Central 
Bank starting from 2014 has increased risk-taking in the Eurozone (e.g., Heider et al., 
2019). Surprisingly, the positive coefficient on the carbon_int is no more statistically robust 
(p-value = 0.156).  
To get more insight into this issue, we split the sample into two groups, “high emitters” 
(also HE hereafter) and “low emitters” (also LE hereafter), according to their sector 
carbon intensity. Carbon risk varies significantly across sectors (UNEP, 2006) and may not 
be captured by the two-digit standard industry classification used in our previous 
regression. Battiston et al. (2017), for instance, document a similar problem for NACE2 and 
NAICS classifications.  
Table 10 displays our sample distribution by sectors based on a six-digit industry code. 
Sectors are listed in descending order of carbon intensity median. Our HE group includes 
sectors having carbon emissions greater than 0.10 tonnes per EUR 1,000 of sales, which 
are: electricity, gas water and multi-utilities, travel and leisure, chemicals, industrial 
materials, industrial metals and mining, energy, general industrials, and construction 
and materials. The Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosure (TCFD, 2017) 
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considers these sectors particularly vulnerable to climate risks. The HE group 
represents about 40% of the sample. 
Column (2) and (3) in Table 9 display the results from the regressions for the HE and LE 
groups, respectively. Interestingly, the coefficient on carbon_int for the HE group is 
positive with a p-value = 0.049, whereas the coefficient on carbon_int x post_2015 is 
positive with a p-value = 0.433. In contrast, the coefficient on carbon_int for the LE group 
is negative with a p-value = 0.519, whereas the coefficient on carbon_int x post_2015 is 
positive with a p-value = 0.018. Taken as a whole, these findings suggest that high emitters 
in the Eurozone were already charged a carbon risk premium before the Paris Agreement, 
but not further penalized thereafter. On the contrary, low emitters started being charged for 
their carbon risk only in the aftermath of the Agreement. According to our analysis, the Paris 
Agreement represents a turning point, in proximity of which lenders have become aware of 
the strong commitment taken by policymakers in fighting climate change and adopting 
consistent actions. Accordingly, they have started taking carbon risk into account for both high 
and low emitters. The regulatory framework therefore appears to have the potential to drive 
the financial system toward incorporating carbon risk into investment decisions.  
Importantly, our findings are robust to alternative criteria for splitting the sample into HE 
and LE groups, including a classification that is based on firm, rather than sector, carbon 
intensity. Results are not tabulated for the sake of parsimony. 
 
(INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE) 
 
4.2.3 The role of disclosure: reporting through the CDP questionnaire 
Table 11 displays the results from the regression model (3), which tests the effect of 
increased levels of disclosure on the cost of debt. Column (1) shows the results for the full 
sample, column (2) for the HE group, and column (3) for the LE group. Column (4) and (5) 
report the results for the HE group in the pre- and post-Paris Agreement period, 
respectively.  
  
(INSERT TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE) 
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As column (1) shows, the coefficient on the interaction term carbon_int x CDP is negative, 
with a p value = 0.086, which suggests that increased levels of transparency on carbon risk 
can contribute to mitigating corporate carbon risk. The coefficient on CDP is positive but 
not statistically robust (p-value = 0.686). When we split the sample into high and low 
emitters, regression estimates indicate that high emitters disclosing through CDP pay, on 
average, a lower cost of debt compared to high emitters not disclosing. The coefficient on 
carbon_int x CDP in column (2) is negative with a p value = 0.034. In column (3), instead, 
both the coefficients on carbon_int x CDP and CDP for low emitters are positive, but with 
large p-values = 0.209 and 0.298, respectively. When we further split the observations for 
the HE group into a pre- and post-Paris Agreement period, the positive effect of disclosing 
for the HE group appears to hold only in the aftermath of the Paris Agreement. The 
coefficient on CDP is negative, with a p-value < 0.001 only in column (5).   
Taken as a whole, our analysis suggests that increased levels of climate-related disclosure 
started playing a role in carbon risk assessment only in the aftermath of the Paris 
Agreement and for high emitters. Results from Table 11 provide support to findings from 
Table 9, which indicate that high emitters have not been further penalized for their 
emissions in the period after the Paris Agreement. In fact, an increased level of disclosure 
might have contributed to mitigating their carbon risk. Results from Table 11 are also 
consistent with research showing that since 2015 banks have become aware of the risk of 
stranded assets for high polluters (e.g., De Greiff, Delis & Ongena, 2018). Accordingly, 
banks may have started considering climate-related information in order to better assess 
corporate carbon risk. 
4.2.4 Third-party verification of emissions and governance 
Table 12 displays results from regression models (4), (5) and (6). For each model, we run 
the regression for the full sample (column 1), for the HE group (column 2), for the LE group 
(column 3), for the period before the Paris Agreement (column 4), and for the period after 




(INSERT TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE) 
 
Results from Table 12 do not provide a clear picture of how lenders view external 
verification of emissions, board oversight of carbon risk and emission reduction targets. 
The top panel of the table shows the results for third-party verification. As expected, the 
coefficient on carbon_int x verified and verified for the full sample is negative. However, 
the large p-values = 0.194 and 0.311, respectively, are not statistically robust to make 
inference. When we split observations into HE and LE groups, the coefficient on verified 
for the HE group is still negative and with a p-value = 0.047, whereas the coefficient on 
carbon_int x verified is negative, yet with a large p-value = 0.617. For the LE group, the 
coefficient on verified is also negative but with a p-value = 0.255, whereas the coefficient 
on carbon_int x verified becomes positive with a p-value = 0.081. Taken as a whole, third-
party verifications appear to be important in decreasing the cost of debt for high polluting 
firms. Surprisingly, they would instead lead to a higher cost of debt for low emitters. When 
we split the observations into the pre- and post-Paris Agreement period, we find that the 
coefficient verified is negative, with a p-value = 0.032 only in the period before the Paris 
Agreement. In the post-Paris period, the coefficient is positive with a very high p-value of 
0.364. Further analysis, not reported, indicates that the pre-Paris effect is led by high 
emitters, which is consistent with low emitters not being charged for carbon risk in the pre-
Paris period.  
The second panel of the table displays results for board oversight of climate-related issues.  
The coefficient on board in column (1) is negative with a p-value = 0.043, which suggests 
that companies with board oversight pay, on average, a lower spread on the cost of debt. 
Columns (4) and (5) further indicate that lenders have started considering board oversight 
only in the aftermath of the Paris Agreement. In column (5), the dummy board has a p-
value < 0.001, while carbon_int x board a p-value = 0.052. Both the coefficients are 
statistically robust. However, while the negative coefficient on board in column (5) suggests 
a mitigating effect of board oversight on the cost of debt, the positive, and larger, coefficient 
on carbon_int x board indicates that the sensitivity to carbon risk in the presence of board 
oversight has increased after the Paris Agreement and results in a higher spread on debt. 
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Indeed, the presence of board oversight could signal a firm’s higher exposure to climate-
related risk, which requires more control. Results for the LE group and for the pre-Paris 
period have very large p-values, which do not support robust conclusions.  
Findings are also unclear when we test the existence of carbon emission reduction 
targets. The third panel of the table reports results from the regression model (3). The 
variables of interest have very large p-values in both the regressions for the full sample and 
the HE group. In column (3), which refers to the LE group, the coefficient on target has a 
p-value = 0.064, while the coefficient on carbon_int x target has a p-value < 0.001. This 
occurrence may be consistent with high emitters from the Eurozone already participating 
in an Emission Trading System (ETS), which set a mandatory cap to their emissions 
decreasing over time. Under ETS, high emitters are already well monitored and driven by 
public authorities to low emissions. For instance, during the fourth ETS phase, which will 
last from 2021 to 2030, the overall number of emission allowances will further decline at 
an annual rate of 2.2% compared to the current 1.74% (European Commission, 2020). In 
such a context, investors could consider emission reduction targets set at a firm level less 
relevant, thus ignoring them in credit risk assessment. However, while the negative 
coefficient on the dummy variable in column (3) indicates that the presence of emission 
reduction targets mitigates corporate carbon risk for low emitters, the positive coefficient 
on carbon_int x target suggests that lenders charge a higher spread to borrowers that have 
a reduction target in place. Again, the presence of emission reduction targets could signal 
that a certain firm, despite belonging to a low-polluting sector, is highly exposed to carbon 
risk compared to its peers, and therefore needs to take action. Inconclusive results in this 
respect have also been found by  Kleimeier and Viehs (2018). 
As is clear, results from Table 12 are not compelling. From a statistical point of view, this 
occurrence could be due to the size of our sub-samples. Sample size is an important input 
to the calculation of confidence limits for measures of effect, and smaller samples can 
contribute to reducing the statistical test’s power (Betensky, 2019). From an economic point 
of view, findings could be consistent with a context in which carbon risk assessment by 
lenders as well as the release of climate-related information by firms are something 
relatively new. Table 8 indeed suggests that lenders have started considering carbon risk 
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for all borrowers, both low or high emitters, after the Paris Agreement. Similarly, Table 11 
shows that climate-related information has started being incorporated in risk assessment 
processes only in the aftermath of the Agreement. As a result, it might take some time for 
investors to incorporate corporate control mechanisms of carbon risk into credit risk 
assessment practices. Further evidence is needed in this respect.  
5 Conclusion 
This study analyses the relationship between corporate carbon risk and the cost of debt 
for a sample of listed firms from the Eurozone for the 2010-2018 period. The geographic 
area under analysis is particularly interesting, as the EU has set sustainable development 
as one of its main objectives (Lisbon Treaty, 2007). Since the Paris Agreement, the 
European Commission has taken an increasing number of actions to rapidly adjust the 
economic system to low-emission targets. In 2018, the European Commission launched the 
Action Plan for financing sustainable growth, which is intended to reorient financial market 
participants toward sustainable investments and to help them better assess climate risk. In 
2019, it released updated guidelines and recommendations on climate-related disclosures, 
which should provide investors with better information on corporate carbon risk. The 
period covered by our analysis allows the examination of the effects of carbon emissions on 
lending policies in the period immediately subsequent to the Paris Agreement.  
Our results provide evidence that higher carbon emissions are associated with a higher 
cost of debt financing. However, while high emitters were already charged a carbon risk 
premium before the Paris Agreement, low emitters started being charged a higher spread 
only in the subsequent period. According to our analysis, in the period surrounding the 
Paris Agreement, lenders changed the way they consider corporate carbon risk. It is likely 
that lenders have become aware of the strong commitment taken by policymakers in fighting 
climate change and adopting consistent actions, thus starting to price carbon risk for all the 
borrowers, despite being either high or low emitters.  
When we investigate the role of disclosure, results indicate that increased levels of climate-
related disclosure exert a mitigating effect on the cost of debt. Such evidence, however, holds 
only for high emitters and in the period after the Paris Agreement, which can explain why 
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high emitters appear not to have been further penalized in the aftermath of the Agreement. 
In fact, increased levels of disclosure might have reduced the risk premium component 
associated to information asymmetry.  
Our results, instead, are not compelling as far as investors view external validation of 
emissions, board oversight of climate-related issues and the existence of emission reduction 
targets. Further evidence is needed in this respect. 
To conclude, this study provides robust evidence that a strong policy commitment to 
keep global warming under control can lead investors to consider corporate carbon risk in 
their investment decisions. As such, our analysis supports the proactivity of the European 
Commission on these issues. With the same aim, further research into the relationship 
between corporate carbon risk and probability of default would be useful. If a robust 
relationship could be empirically proved, then regulators should differentiate between high 
and low emitters for capital requirement purposes so as to further incentivize financial 
institutions’ investments in the transition to a low carbon economy.   
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  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Total 
Firms targeted by CDP 6,221 6,557 7,071 7,455 7,167 6,302 5,815 6,028 6,083 58,699 
Asia 2,013 2,185 2,203 2,287 2,495 2,084 1,937 2,007 2,030 19,241 
America 1,757 1,336 1,685 1,816 1,734 1,337 1,275 1,485 1,454 13,879 
Africa 131 150 155 162 134 130 97 122 123 1,204 
Oceania 263 282 306 321 291 271 263 264 269 2,530 
Europe 2,056 2,604 2,721 2,869 2,513 2,480 2,243 2,149 2,207 21,842 
Firms answering to CDP 2,434 2,464 2,534 2,700 2,575 2,776 2,506 2,756 2,372 23,117 
Asia 525 562 594 618 619 683 649 748 641  5,639 
America 770 656 688 746 726 791 683 776 703  6,539  
Africa 70 84 86 89 86 89 69 84 67  724  
Oceania 111 115 119 122 102 117 103 108 89 986 
Europe 958 1,047 1,047 1,125 1,042 1,096 1,002 1,039 872  9,228  
Firms with scope 1 emissions externally verified 630 805 995 1,051 1,139 1,217 1,193 1,358 1,333 9,721 
Firms with scope 2 emissions externally verified 546 729 915 1,001 1,091 1,174 1,152 1,316 1,297 9,221 
Firms with board oversight of climate-related issues 1,238 1,137 1,286 1,359 1,442 1,538 1,472 1,737 1,686 12,895 
Firms with emission reduction targets 927 1,030 1,198 1,280 1,370 1,456 1,410 1,662 1,529 11,862 
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Firm-year observations for the Eurozone 11,253 
- Financial institutions (1,296) 
- Missing data (carbon intensity or control variables) (8,132) 
- Failed or delisted companies (109) 
- Firms with zero debt (17) 
- Outliers (trimmed 5-95%) (230) 
  








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4 – Sample distribution by ICB Industry (firm-year observations) 
 Frequency Percentage Cumulated 
Basic Materials 149 10.14 10.14 
Consumer Discretionary 231 15.72 25.87 
Consumer Staples 110 7.49 33.36 
Energy 98 6.67 40.03 
Health Care 84 5.72 45.75 
Industrials 429 29.20 74.95 
Technology 91 6.19 81.14 
Telecommunications 127 8.65 89.79 
Utilities 150 10.21 100 





Table 5 – Sample distribution by country (firm-year observations) 
 Frequency Percentage Cumulated 
Austria 40 2.72 2.72 
Belgium 44 3.00 5.72 
Finland 161 10.96 16.68 
France 355 24.17 40.84 
Germany 295 20.08 60.93 
Greece 22 1.50 62.42 
Ireland 62 4.22 66.64 
Italy 136 9.26 75.90 
Luxembourg 24 1.63 77.54 
Netherlands 134 9.12 86.66 
Portugal 38 2.59 89.24 
Spain 158 10.76 100 
Total 1,469 100  
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Table 6 – Sample descriptive statistics 
Variable Count Mean p25 Median p75 SD Minimum Maximum 
Ln(cod) 1,469 5.95 5.71 6.00 6.24 0.40 4.78 6.85 
Carbon_int 1,469 0.41 0.02 0.06 0.37 1.00 0.00 8.76 
Lev 1,469 0.63 0.53 0.63 0.72 0.15 0.17 1.44 
Op_marg 1,469 0.10 0.04 0.09 0.14 0.1 -0.41 0.54 
Wc_ta 1,469 0.07 -0.02 0.05 0.14 0.13 -0.45 0.51 
Size 1,469 16.21 15.30 16.08 17.15 1.29 13.09 19.81 
Euribor 1,469 0.48 -0.16 0.31 1.08 0.64 -0.26 1.64 
CDP 1,206 0.88 - - - 0.33 0.00 1.00 
Verified 1,044 0.93 - - - 0.26 0.00 1.00 
Board 1,059 0.89 - - - 0.31 0.00 1.00 
Target 1,053 0.90 - - - 0.30 0.00 1.00 
List of Variables: Ln(cod) is the dependent variable defined as the natural logarithm of the ratio between interest expense 
on debt and average total debt; Carbon_int is the carbon intensity computed as the ratio between scope 1 and scope 2 
emissions over revenues. Lev is the leverage defined as total liabilities over total assets. Op_marg is the operative margin 
defined as the ratio between operating income and revenues. Wc_ta is the ratio of working capital over total assets. Size 
is the natural logarithm of total assets. Euribor is the yearly average of the 6-months Euribor. CDP is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the firms answers the CDP questionnaire. Verified is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has either 
scope 1 or scope 2 emissions externally verified. Board is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has board oversight 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 8 – Regression results – Carbon risk 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Full Sample Full Sample Pre-Paris Agreement Post-Paris Agreement 
Carbon_int  0.0449 0.0345 0.0521 
  (0.001) (0.093) (0.000) 
Lev 0.360 0.418 0.309 0.563 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.032) (0.000) 
Op_marg -0.708 -0.693 -0.837 -0.537 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
Wc_ta 0.308 0.334 0.291 0.370 
 (0.040) (0.021) (0.084) (0.135) 
Size 0.0182 0.0162 0.00682 0.0257 
 (0.201) (0.250) (0.637) (0.144) 
Constant 5.576 5.552 5.843 5.299 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Euribor Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,469 1,469 886 583 
Adjusted R2 0.257 0.267 0.205 0.202 
p-values in parentheses  
In bold variables of specific interest for the analysis. List of Variables: Ln(cod) is the dependent variable defined as the 
natural logarithm of the ratio between interest expense on debt and average total debt; Carbon_int is the carbon intensity 
computed as the ratio between scope 1 and scope 2 emissions over revenues. Lev is the leverage defined as total liabilities 
over total assets. Op_marg is the operative margin defined as the ratio between operating income and revenues. Wc_ta 
is the ratio of working capital over total assets. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Euribor is the yearly average 
of the 6-months Euribor. CDP is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firms answers the CDP questionnaire. Verified is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has either scope 1 or scope 2 emissions externally verified. Board is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the firm has board oversight of climate-related issues. Target is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
firm has an emissions reduction target. Industry is the 2-digits ICB industry code. 
Robust standard errors clustered by firm and year. 
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Table 9 – Regression results – Post-Paris effect and High versus Low emitters 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Full Sample HE Group LE Group 
Carbon_int 0.0270 0.0362 -0.0211 
 (0.156) (0.049) (0.519) 
Carbon_int x Post_2015 0.0418 0.0182 0.103 
 (0.059) (0.433) (0.018) 
Post_2015 -0.149 -0.142 -0.144 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) 
Lev 0.386 0.224 0.463 
 (0.001) (0.185) (0.001) 
Op_marg -0.712 -0.737 -0.668 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
Wc_ta 0.246 -0.427 0.475 
 (0.078) (0.028) (0.007) 
Size 0.0106 0.0115 -0.00186 
 (0.423) (0.628) (0.934) 
Constant 5.528 6.168 5.434 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Euribor Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,469 599 870 
Adjusted R2 0.335 0.361 0.353 
p-values in parentheses  
In bold variables of specific interest for the analysis. List of Variables: Ln(cod) is the dependent 
variable defined as the natural logarithm of the ratio between interest expense on debt and average 
total debt; Carbon_int is the carbon intensity computed as the ratio between scope 1 and scope 2 
emissions over revenues. Lev is the leverage defined as total liabilities over total assets. Op_marg 
is the operative margin defined as the ratio between operating income and revenues. Wc_ta is the 
ratio of working capital over total assets. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Euribor is 
the yearly average of the 6-months Euribor. CDP is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firms 
answers the CDP questionnaire. Verified is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has either 
scope 1 or scope 2 emissions externally verified. Board is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm 
has board oversight of climate-related issues. Target is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm 
has an emissions reduction target. Industry is the 6-digit ICB industry code. 




Table 10 – Sample distribution by  sector -Carbon intensity statistics 
 Median Mean Min Max Sd N. 
Electricity 1.18 1.37 0.01 5.60 1.13 89 
Gas, Water and Multi-utilities 0.94 1.23 0.22 3.62 1.02 61 
Travel and Leisure 0.58 0.66 0.00 1.44 0.53 30 
Chemicals 0.52 0.71 0.02 4.81 0.76 80 
Industrial Materials 0.46 0.51 0.34 0.76 0.16 16 
Industrial Metals and Mining 0.36 0.45 0.00 1.10 0.25 53 
Energy 0.36 0.48 0.00 3.42 0.51 98 
General Industrials 0.30 0.34 0.02 0.86 0.28 29 
Construction and Materials 0.11 1.22 0.01 8.76 2.33 143 
Food Producers 0.10 0.19 0.06 0.74 0.19 29 
Beverages 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.12 0.04 33 
Automobiles and Parts 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.19 0.04 59 
Health Care Providers 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.01 8 
Electronic and Electrical Equipment 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.15 0.03 42 
Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology 0.04 0.36 0.01 3.21 0.88 56 
Industrial Transportation 0.04 0.16 0.00 7.28 0.73 98 
Personal Care, Drug and Grocery Stores 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.10 0.02 48 
Household Goods and Home Construction 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.01 11 
Telecommunications Service Providers 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.18 0.03 110 
Retailers 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.08 0.02 16 
Medical Equipment and Services 0.03 0.12 0.01 0.72 0.22 20 
Aerospace and Defense 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.14 0.03 38 
Industrial Engineering 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.01 42 
Technology Hardware and Equipment 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.38 0.10 32 
Telecommunications Equipment 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 17 
Industrial Support Services 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.01 37 
Software and Computer Services 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.01 59 
Media 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.12 0.02 79 
Leisure Goods 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 8 
Personal Goods 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 28 
Total 0.06 0.41 0.00 8.76 1.00 1,469 
  
44  
Table 11 – Regression results – The effect of disclosure: answering the CDP questionnaire 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 




Carbon_int 0.0920 0.0692 0.0486 -0.498 0.0695 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.240) (0.253) (0.000) 
Carbon_int x CDP -0.0582 -0.0407 0.424 0.524 -0.0479 
 (0.086) (0.128) (0.209) (0.230) (0.304) 
CDP 0.0192 -0.190 0.0603 -0.0943 -0.319 
 (0.686) (0.034) (0.298) (0.405) (0.000) 
Lev 0.491 0.187 0.583 0.0483 0.552 
 (0.000) (0.337) (0.000) (0.814) (0.009) 
Op_marg -0.697 -0.778 -0.753 -0.977 -0.375 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Wc_ta 0.249 -0.476 0.539 -0.347 -0.343 
 (0.013) (0.006) (0.000) (0.328) (0.280) 
Size 0.0236 0.0291 0.00624 0.00747 0.0693 
 (0.087) (0.242) (0.810) (0.804) (0.006) 
Constant 5.102 5.939 5.015 6.363 5.199 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Euribor Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,132 474 658 281 193 
Adjusted R2 0.389 0.417 0.414 0.383 0.443 
p-values in parentheses 
In bold variables of specific interest for the analysis. List of Variables: Ln(cod) is the dependent variable defined as the natural 
logarithm of the ratio between interest expense on debt and average total debt; Carbon_int is the carbon intensity computed as 
the ratio between scope 1 and scope 2 emissions over revenues. Lev is the leverage defined as total liabilities over total assets. 
Op_marg is the operative margin defined as the ratio between operating income and revenues. Wc_ta is the ratio of working 
capital over total assets. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Euribor is the yearly average of the 6-months Euribor. CDP 
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firms answers the CDP questionnaire. Verified is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm 
has either scope 1 or scope 2 emissions externally verified. Board is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has board oversight 
of climate-related issues. Target is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has an emissions reduction target. Industry is the 6-
digit ICB industry code. 






Table 12 – Regression results – Third-party verification of emissions, board oversight of climate 
issues, and emissions reduction target 
p-values in parentheses 
In bold variables of specific interest for the analysis. List of Variables: Ln(cod) is the dependent variable defined as the natural logarithm of the ratio 
between interest expense on debt and average total debt; Carbon_int is the carbon intensity computed as the ratio between scope 1 and scope 2 emissions 
over revenues. Lev is the leverage defined as total liabilities over total assets. Op_marg is the operative margin defined as the ratio between operating 
income and revenues. Wc_ta is the ratio of working capital over total assets. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Euribor is the yearly average of 
the 6-months Euribor. CDP is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firms answers the CDP questionnaire. Verified is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm 
has either scope 1 or scope 2 emissions externally verified. Board is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has board oversight of climate-related issues. 
Target is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has an emissions reduction target. Industry is the 6-digit ICB industry code. 
Robust standard errors clustered by firm and year. 
 











Panel A: Third-party emissions verification 
Carbon_int x Verified -0.0337 -0.0151 0.974 -0.0292 -0.482 
 (0.194) (0.617) (0.081) (0.331) (0.396) 
Verified -0.0719 -0.197 -0.0844 -0.126 0.118 
 (0.311) (0.047) (0.255) (0.032) (0.364) 
Control variables, industry, and 
country indicators 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Euribor Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,037 494 543 662 375 
Adjusted R2 0.387 0.381 0.438 0.347 0.428 
 
Panel B: Board oversight of climate-related issues 
Carbon_int x Board 0.123 -0.0495 1.625 0.0678 0.514 
 (0.132) (0.590) (0.680) (0.251) (0.052) 
Board -0.100 0.00328 -0.141 -0.0711 -0.0833 
 (0.043) (0.985) (0.165) (0.142) (0.000) 
Control variables, industry, and 
country indicators 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Euribor Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,052 496 556 677 375 
Adjusted R2 0.385 0.371 0.433 0.333 0.438 
 
Panel C: Emissions Reduction Target 
Carbon_int x Target 0.0537 -0.00222 2.987 -0.0193 -0.226 
 (0.452) (0.977) (0.000) (0.785) (0.399) 
Target -0.0364 -0.0161 -0.123 0.00683 -0.0724 
 (0.517) (0.841) (0.064) (0.905) (0.483) 
Control variables, industry, and 
country indicators 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Euribor Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,046 496 550 676 370 
Adjusted R2 0.382 0.370 0.438 0.329 0.439 
